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What Do We Learn?
In this paper I wish to give some idea of how one group of psychologists are working upon the problem of "What do we learn ?" and the kind of answers which they are producing.
The method I am going to discuss is often referred to as a probability theory of learning; essentially the technique is to ascertain the frequency of some events and the uncertainty of others. This uncertainty can be defined technically in the language of information theory, where the information is determined entirely by the probability of an event. One binary unit ("bit") of information is the amount of information given by an event where only two things could occur; for example, would a given baby be a boy or a girl. The announcement to the new mother may be of some interest but statistically it only conveys one bit of information. (The illustration is intended to give both the limitations and the elegant neatness of the approach.) But for the psychologist the importance of information theory and similar measures of uncertainty lies not so much in the mathematics of measuring the probabilities on a relative frequency basis, for these are common enough techniques to many sciences, but rather in the way such procedures allow him to reformulate his problem. This point needs stressing because psychologists, like other scientists, are impressed by figures and the impact of information theory is often limited to considering it as a statistical procedure, whereas it would seem to me that the more significant consequence is the way it has contributed to our thinking on the importance of the perceptual aspects of a problem. We now not only have a neat statistical technique for quantifying data but by reason of it we are thinking differently about the perceptual problems in learning. In the current jargon the task is one in which so much information in the environment has to be transmitted; that is, we have so much input information on the one side, say in any given series of signals, and so much output information in the response and our task is to measure the capacity of this communication channel (which in psychology is the human subject). We do so by measuring how much information can be transmitted by such a system, or, to put it in another way, we find out what is the correspondence between the input and output messages. If a human operator is given more signals to receive than he can handle he will necessarily lose a lot of information and we can infer that the channel capacity is below that level. If he is performing to the best of his ability and can match his responses to the signals we can say this represents the channel capacity of that individual. In what ways, if any, this capacity may vary is the problem of learning. But it is important that the newness of the jargon does not blind us to the essential point-we are using a frequency measure of what information there is in a signal, we aim to say, statistically, how much a human subject can perceive and to how much he can respond. It is believed that this will give us one answer to what exactly has been learned in a particular situation. I wish primarily to use this approach to illustrate how we can study everyday motor skitls but first let us consider a few classical examples of learning. In a world of variety and change an organism has to find some measure of regularity-some measure of what is constant. Individuals can do this by several means-a popular one is that of sheer ignorance or a failure to recognize a difference. But the most common is to learn something about the environment-a person can then on the basis of past occurrences predict which event will follow another; what are the possibilities that given situation "a", "b" will follow. If he can say this, then statistically he has simplified his task, and an individual's behaviour illustrates this simplification. He does not have to look quite so hard for event "b". This is not a theoretical argument without evidence: in reaction-time experiments we find a subject can respond faster if the signal occurs during the fore-period when statistically it is most likely to happen and when a subject through his experience has learned that it will probably occur. If you prefer everyday examples there is the situation of the athlete about to start a race. Previous to getting on the track he does not start running when any gun is DECEMBM fired but once he has been given the starter's "get set" he will be off if you sneeze. The information he requires at that particular point is minimal.
Let us now look at conditioning procedure-the Pavlovian case of the dog with its private dinner gong to which it salivated prior to its meal, or an individual blinking to a light flash which will be followed by a blast of air. In situations like this it seems that a subject behaves in a similar way to a conditional probability system; that is, the organism has stored some measure of how frequently one signal has been followed by another. It now responds to the first signal as if it could be taken as indicating the second. The animal does not confuse the signals-the dog no more tries to eat the bell than we attack the dinner gong. It responds to the bell not as an isolated signal but as one stimulus linked to another. The relationship -that is, the temporal and numerical relationship-between the two signals has been learned by the subject. He now knows what are the chances of one signal being followed by another and responds accordingly to them.
We can say then that the probability of the food following the bell is so great that the second event occurring after the first carries little information for the subject. He has learned how to cope with these two events by treating them not as so many independent signals but as serially dependent upon each other. There may be no particular reason why a sequence is what it is-merely that a subject's experience has shown that there is generally this serial order. But the effect of learning this regularly is to make prediction possiblea subject then is handling very little information in receiving the second event. It would seem that this conditional probability model does give us a fairly simple system for one kind of learning, and models, such as Dr. A. M. Uttley's, have illustrated its operation.
Let us now consider what appears a different operation, as in a classical experiment on attitude in recognition (Zangwill, 1937) . In this situation characteristic psychological material-ink blots-was used. Subjects were asked to look in turn at six ink blots which the experimenter said would remind them of mountain scenery-they were asked to name them. Then they were shown another six blots and told these would remind them of common animals, and they were asked to name these. In general the subjects failed to notice that one of the ink blots was common to both series, and two-thirds of them happily gave it a topographical location in the first series and dubbed it an animal in the second.
In other words we have a stimulus pattern but previous experience of the subject leads him to expect, or has increased the probability of him considering, one solution in one situation and a different one in the next. The information content of the particular ink blot was identical-it was the same independent blot. But subjects responded to the situations not as one in which there were any number of equi-probable solutions, but one in which certain categories were much more likely than others. What actually has been done? The stimulus patterns have been treated as if they were presenting a lower amount of information than in fact they were. And of course this is exactly what we have to do if we are to live comfortably. It pays us to consider only a limited range of possibilities and if we don't find the answer to put up with a near miss; to be wrong a few times for the benefit of being right quickly a great many. For example we do not have to learn how to open every door when we are confronted with the handle. We depress it, and we are generally right. But what happens when the handle is in the vertical position as in the modern car. My score card says that more than half my passengers have locked themselves in when trying to get out. (This might be expected from car designers who, noticing that we have two legs, have thoughtfully provided us with three pedals.) The subject of speech and hearing is a particularly relevant example of how we learn the probabilities of one syllable being followed by another, and come to expect certain sequences. It is not necessary, thankfully, to listen to every word I say. If we start discussing neurotic patients and clinical syndromes I can probably get away with saying "trick cyclist" when I intend to say "psychiatrist". At a broader level we do distort the evidence; we make a travesty of the input and keep our prejudices. Of course if we overdo it we land up at the Maudsley-as a patient.
This way of considering the probabilities of behaviour can be applied to many psychological experiments-say to Luchins' (1942) experiments on rigidity in problem solving, to Harlow's (1949) work on learning sets, to my own experiments (Kay, 1954) manipulating spatial proximities to vary the difficulty of a task. But I should now like to turn to what again seems a very different field of learning and one where this approach may seem less applicable; this is the field of motor skills. Let us look at an everyday example of a games player. The M.C.C. handbook regards fielding as the most natural of cricketing skills but suppose we try throwing a ball for a young boy to catch-we generally find he is far too slow in his reactions and he will let the ball hit him in the chest before he gets his hands to it. Why is he so slow? We say he doesn't anticipate the flight of the ball, he doesn't move himself or his hands towards it until it is too late. The youngster has to watch the ball all the way; he never knows where it will go but only where it is. As yet he has not learned to predict. What then has he to learn to be able to predict in this situation? We may think of the trajectory of the ball as being divided up into a series of segments each of which we will call an event. An individual learns the order and temporal relationship of these events. He learns that given positions "a" and "b" the possibility of "c"-i.e. the ball at a particular point in space and time-are far greater than for "d", another such point. We might say then that given an initial series of events the individual learns which other events will occur. The skill so far is twofold-firstly, appreciating that it is a series of events and then learning to predict which series on the basis of the fewest possible initial events. Once this is done then the remaining events of the series are redundant-or at the most confirmatory. We can say, and will no doubt continue to say, that an individual anticipates in this situation-but strictly speaking his learning has enabled him to extract all the information from the initial events of the series, leaving the remaining redundant.
We are then putting the emphasis on the perceptual side of skills and saying that the ability to receive information would seem to be the secret of many skilled actions. Ostensibly we witness an economy and uniformity of action that is giving the exponent all the time in the world-but its basis is the expert's ability to handle both the incoming signals from the external display and the incoming signals from his own musculature. From previous learning he knows the kind of signals he is likely to receive-and given any particular one he can probably predict what will follow. By this means he is able to handle a situation in which he is literally bombarded with stimulation but whose information content is low because of its redundancy. From this standpoint the channel capacity of the skilled player has not changed from when he was unskilled. But by learning for particular contexts the frequency of certain signals and the improbability of others he is able to handle in any unit time many more actual signals. He does not receive more information. As suggested by Hick (1952) the rate of gain of information is constant but learning enables a subject to cut down the information content of the individual signals so that more can be received in a given time without increasing the information load.
The strength of this approach lies in the ease with which quantitative analysis becomes possible, but it might be argued that it is somewhat defeatist since it seems to leave out psychology. It is too preoccupied with the transmission of events and not with the system itself. Ablation studies which apparently make a direct link between performance and brain structure enjoy great prestige in psychology, and this is undoubtedly founded on the idea that with this technique the experimentalist is taking the lid off the works-the black box-and having a look inside. This then is the direct approach-a correlation between internal structure and behaviour. But is it? Do we in fact obtain direct evidence about the mechanism when we observe the behaviour of a damaged system? What we obtain is the same as with other observational studies-evidence from which we may or may not be able to infer the mechanism. And unfortunately, the behaviour of a mutilated system is open to a greater number of interpretations than the same behaviour from an intact system (cf. Deutsch, 1955) . With animal ablation studies, where a systematic series of experiments can be conducted, and particularly where the experimenter can refer back to the performance of other intact animals, it is possible to reduce the number of interpretations. And of course if you have been wise in choosing a species such as the octopus which anatomically lends itself to ablation techniques then this further reduces some of the difficulties. But on the other hand it takes one farther from human studies, if one wishes to draw parallels.
We do, of course, get striking, even bizarre, results from ablation studies, as from other brain-damaged patients. And these have been and may be helpful in suggesting ideas about the system. I am not at all opposed to such studies but I hope I have said enough to indicate that even so-called direct methods of study may not be so direct as is often thought.
To sum up my answer to the question "What do we learn ?" In many learning studies we are now putting the emphasis on the perceptual ability of the individual. The key to this perception is appreciating the relatively low information content of the incoming signals, often because they are not independent items but dependent signals within a series. In a world where so much is changing the individual finds it convenient if not essential to look for the probables and ignore the irregularities. It is therefore not surprising, but it is a little ironical that in this self-created monotone of existence an artificially created "variety" is still his "spice of life". Professor H. J. Eysenck (Institute of Psychiatry, Maudsley Hospital):
Modern Learning Theory If it is agreed that the modification of the central nervous system through experience which we call "learning" is the basis of most, if not all, human and animal behaviour patterns, then itlwill be clear why modern learning theory occupies such a prominent part in psychology.
Most influential in this connexion has been the work of Clark L. Hull, whose Principles of Behavior has become the classic text (Hull, 1943) . The model of learning which he elaborated is a combination and formalization of two streams of thought, both of which are of considerable antiquity. One component is that of hedonism, or motivation by pain and pleasure. This was formalized and subjected to experimental study by Thorndike as the "law of effect", and now emerges under the name of "reinforcement" or "drive reduction".
The other component is that of associationism; this was brought under experimental control by Pavlov and Bechtereff, in the form of conditioning or habit formation.
Hull joined these components in an impressive theoretical structure, the formal character of which makes possible large numbers of experimental predictions, many of which have been verified. This approach, it should be stressed, is a purely molar one; the concepts used are what psychologists call "intervening variables" or "hypothetical constructs" for which no neurological or physiological equivalent is necessarily postulated, although most psychologists would probably expect to encounter such equivalents, if only neurology and physiology were more advanced than they are (Osgood, 1953) . The most important aspect of the Hullian theory is the dissociation of performance (symbolized by Hull asSER) from habit (symbolized as S R). The letters S and R here denote stimulus and response respectively. Habit is conceived as the relatively permanent modification of the nervous system which mediates learning; the locus of this modification lies between the cortical representation of the stimulus and the cortical innervation causally preceding the response. Habits as so conceived are not directly visible or measurable; they can be indexed in terms of performance only under very special conditions. To equate habit and performance, as is often done by experimenters lacking psychological sophistication, is to invite disaster.
A very important part of Hull's work has been the elaboration of a formula linking the concepts of habit and performance. He does this by invoking another concept, namely that of drive (D). Drives in his system are the result of physiological needs such as hunger, thirst, sex, &c.; Hull takes great care in his definition of the concept of drive to avoid the many difficulties which have bedevilled the related concept of instinct.
The fundamental formula then, which links performance, habit and drive, is as follows:
In other words, performance is a multiplicative function of habit and drive, and we can only use performance as a measure of habit if we keep drive constant. When drive is zero there is no performance, however strong the habit may be; we have many habits, but these are only translated into performance when sparked off by a suitable drive. Much experimental work has been done on the conditions determining the growth of SHR. Among those found to be relevant are the number of reinforcements given, the nature and amount of the reinforcing agent, and the delay in reinforcement. In the studies sorting out the influence of these variables, no distinction is made between trial and error learning of the traditional kind, and classical conditioning as introduced by Pavlov; the theory is claimed to be universally applicable to all the phenomena of learning. It will be noted that among the variables determining the growth of habit, drive is not included. This is not an accidental oversight, but a part of the theoretical structure. For Hull, the amount of drive present during learning is irrelevant. This somewhat paradoxical position has been criticized, and recent experimental evidence suggests that Hull was mistaken in his neglect of drive as determining the, H growth of S R (Osgood, 1953) .
Further concepts are necessary to make this formula applicable to the majority of experimental studies. In particular, we must add the concepts of reactive inhibition ( R) and of conditioned inhibition (S R). According to the theory, all learning, that is, all formation of stimulus-response connexions, produces some degree of inhibition or fatigue in the mediating structures; this fatigue acts as a negative drive and tends to di6sipate with time during periods of rest. Such dissipation acts as a reinforcement for the prevailing state of affairs, namely, the state of rest, so that we obtain a negative habit, that is, a habit of not responding to the stimulus. Hull's general formula for performance therefore needs to be complicated by the addition of R and S R, as well as several others not mentioned in this brief summary; there is good experimental evid-nce in each case to support the concepts postulated, and their method of integration into the general formula.
There are other systems which also attempt to provide a formal theory for the phenomena of mammalian learning, all of which differ from Hull's in important respects. None of these, however, has been worked out in sufficient detail to generate the vast amount of detailed and precise predictions which can be made from Hull's principles. It is small wonder, therefore, that it has recently been found that no other book is quoted as frequently by psychologists in their writings as is Principles of Behavior. Similarly, no other system has given rise to so many experimental attempts to test its predictions, or to modify its hypotheses. While undoubtedly such experimental work will extensively modify the system, and has indeed already shown up considerable deficiencies in it, yet there seems to be no doubt that Hull has made a very great contribution indeed to psychology and has enabled us to transcend the purely empirical type of work which was so common in the first decades of this century.
The application of Hullian learning theory to the complex phenomena of social learning and psychiatry can be made in two ways. We can conceive of the symptoms shown by mentally ill people as the products of the learning process obeying the laws which Hull has laid down. A typically early example of such an application was Watson's famous demonstration of the experimental induction of a phobia in a 3-year-old boy by means ofa conditioning technique. Equally, we would then think of a therapy as the removal of such symptoms and habits, also by the application of the laws of modern learning theory. Again, Watson's success in removing the phobia he had induced by means of experimental excitation may be cited as a very early example of this approach. Among psychiatrists, Wolpe (1952, 1954) of South Africa is a prominent exponent of these techniques, and his own work is in impressive confirmation of the possibilities opened up by this new approach. Here, it would seem, we have the beginning of what no other theory has ever been able to give us in the psychiatric field, namely, a rational method of treatment based on well-known and experimentally demonstrated scientific principles (Eysenck, 1956) . Few people who have given serious consideration to this approach doubt that in due course it will oust the so-called psychotherapeutic approaches, which not only fail to be based on independently demonstrable and experimentally established general psychological laws, but which also, in spite of fifty years of extensive application, have signally failed to present any evidence of therapeutic effectiveness (Eysenck, 1952) .
Another mode of application of the principles of learning theory was adumbrated by Pavlov, who suggested on the basis of systematic observations of hospitalized psychiatric patients that hysteria was due to exaggeratedly strong inhibition, while psychasthenia was due to an exaggeratedly strong excitation. As hysteria is strongly linked with extraversion and psychasthenia with introversion, this hypothesis gives us the possible basis for a typology soundly based. on experimental findings. Large numbers of experiments have been done recently in an effort to investigate some of the consequences of this theory, which have been formalized and generalized by the present writer. Results have throughout been strongly favourable, leading one to the conclusion that Pavlov's long-neglected observation shows a considerable degree of insight and opens up a whole new chapter in the history of personality research (Eysenck, 1955a (Eysenck, , 1955b .
These two applications of learning theory to psychiatry are not, of course, mutually exclusive. In line with Pavlov's hypothesis, C. M. Franks (1956) has shown that introverted neurotics, i.e. those suffering from anxiety, reactive depression and obsessional compulsive disorders, tend to condition very easily; while extroverted neurotics, i.e. those suffering from hysterical and psychopathic disorders, condition only with great difficulty. This typological and purely descriptive approach can be used in discovering the correct method of re-training a particular patient and eliminating the symptoms or habits of which he complains. (It is obvious that psychiatric symptoms in learning theory are to be classed as habits, i.e. come H under the heading of S R; this learning theory contrasts strongly with Freud's theory, which tends to regard symptoms as symbolic activities characteristic of some purely hypothetical and ill-conceived unconscious conflict. The fact that so-called symptomatic cures can be achieved which are long-lasting and do not produce alternative symptoms argues strongly against the Freudian hypothesis.) Enuresis, tics, writer's cramp, stammer, and a variety of obscure autonomic dysfunctions have been treated very successfully by conditioning procedures, even when the patient had been treated unsuccessfully by psychotherapeutic methods for many years, but it does appear that such re-training methods are more effective in introverted people, i.e. those who condition easily, than in extroverts, i.e. those who condition more easily. In this way therapy becomes properly related to diagnosis (it is well known that in orthodox psychiatry as well as in psychoanalysis there is a very tenuous Proceedings of the Royal Sociey of Medicine 36 relationship between diagnosis and treatment); thus modem learning theory provides us not only with a rational method of treatment, but also with a rational method of diagnosis.
It will be obvious to the reader that, in view of the very recent development of learning theory, its application to psychiatric problems must be in its infancy. The fact that so many promising results have already been achieved in such a short period of time, and on the basis of a very imperfect type of theory, leads us to the confident expectation that an improvement in the theory, and further research into the application of that theory to psychiatrically ill patients, will provide the great upsurge in therapeutic effectiveness which psychoanalysis originally promised to give but failed to provide.
